This presentation will discuss the need for national-level organizational strategies to effectively combat cyber security threats and cybercrime. In many countries, new agencies have been established and/or new roles have been allotted to existing agencies to cope with the needs for cyber security or fighting against cybercrime. The two pillars of organizational structure and functions (i.e., security vs. law enforcement) have given new challenges to us, especially in the context of traditional criminal justice system. To illustrate the challenges, a case study examining the responses to major security incidents followed by nationwide debates and remarkable organizational changes in Korea will be given.
[ Figure 1 ] U.S. Crime Trend, 1973 Trend, --2003 Ouimet (2008) identifies Internet usage as the main reason for this unexpected change in crime trends.
Based on Cohen and Felson's Routine Activities Theory, he argues that since Netscape and Internet Explorer became standard in operating systems in 1994 and 1995, the Internet has brought a transformation in the daily routines of people, increased the possibility of crime detection because of the almost permanent traces, and provided people with information that has crime protection potential, and therefore contributed to the significant decrease of crime during the 1990s 10 .
While this may hold true for the sudden change in non-cybercrime trends of the United States in the 1990s, many questions still remain unanswered or inadequately addressed. For example, does this mean that the arrival of networked technology cause a decline in the overall crime rate? In contrast to the decrease of violent crime in the 1990s, complaints on all kinds of cybercrime have been showing a sharp increase, and the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) now receives more complaints in a single month than it received in its first six months 11 .
[ Figure 2 ] Internet Crime Complaints, 2000 Complaints, --2011 Then, in this case, can it be that the decline of crimes in the real world was actually a natural corollary of the crime transition from the physical space to cyberspace? Or can it be that the Internet rather brings an increase in crime rate by providing new opportunities to meet strangers in the cyberspace and plot a crime in the real world? Ouimet's explanation may account for the changes in crime trend of the United States during the 1990s, but it cannot be generalized to explain the changes in other Internet-using countries which show very different results regarding the impact of Internet usage on crime rates. This illustrates the need for a more comprehensive and generalizable theory for explaining cybercrime.
In fact, many attempts have been made to explain certain types of cybercrime with existing theories of criminology. But as cybercrime is a set of various types of crimes and does not clearly fit into the assumptions made by criminology, it is critical yet difficult to find a way to explain the phenomenon as a whole. In order to better understand the impacts of cybercrime Jaishankar (2008) has tried to provide an overall explanation for the phenomenon of cybercrime with his 'Space Transition Theory 12 ,' which postulates the following:
1. Persons, with repressed criminal behavior ( in the physical space) have a propensity to commit crime in cyberspace, which, otherwise they would not commit in physical space, due to their status and position.
2. Identity, Flexibility, Dissociative Anonymity and lack of deterrence factor in the cyberspace provides the offenders the choice to commit cybercrime.
3. Criminal behavior of offenders in cyberspace is likely to be imported to Physical space which, in physical space may be exported to cyberspace as well. Despite of the absence of a consistent and comprehensive definition of cybercrime, as criminology has started viewing the emergence of cyberspace as a new locus of criminal activity 13 , Jaishankar's attempt to take an overall look at cybercrime is meaningful. However, although his theory seems to be persuasive, there is a need to test whether the above statements actually explains cyber-criminal activities. Perhaps the most general way to do this, as in verifying hypotheses in other fields as well, is by using quantitative data such as statistics.
What this change in the landscape of criminal justice implies is that unlike the information of traditional crimes that usually flows through a single channel, the information of cybercrime is distributed among many private and public entities, so without adequate networking and collaboration among these organizations it is difficult to establish a comprehensive national, or even international, strategy to combat cybercrime. As Wall himself mentions, "We need reliable information about criminal trends not only to make sense of 'the problem', but also to act as a key driver of (criminal justice) policy reform and resource allocation within relevant agencies 19 . (...) The key issue here is about whether reliable information flows freely to form reliable viewpoints 20 ." This account makes it clear that cooperation among various organizations with different functions is critical to grasp the situation of cybercrime and establish effective strategies to deal with it by enabling the provision of reliable information. From a long-term perspective, this is certain to have a bigger impact on the development of cyber criminology or criminology in general, both in verifying new theories that purport to explain cybercrime and in assisting the academic field to understand cybercrime more comprehensively.
But before arguing that multi-agency cross-sector partnerships are necessary for the development of criminology and more effective policies to combat cybercrime, taking a look at how the organizations involved in this issue are structured in reality would help to find more specific and feasible solution, since there exists a huge difference among states in the way the relevant entities are organized.
III. Approaches on Cyber Attacks: Security vs. Law Enforcement i. The Two Approaches on Cyber Attacks
To date, many states have placed 'combating cybercrime' on the national agenda, and cybercrime has become an important issue at the global level as well. Yet not many countries have come up with an effective way to harmonize the functions of existing organizations and government agencies to better cope with the issue. Apart from the lack of a standard definition of cybercrime and the difficulty in measuring it, the absence of a holistic approach in viewing the issue of cybercrime stands as the main obstacle in establishing a comprehensive national strategy for cybercrime.
Currently there are two main approaches which is common at both the national and international level when viewing cyber attacks: a security-oriented approach, which first originated from viewing the threats from cyberspace as a technical threat to national security; and a law enforcement approach, which approaches the issue from a criminal justice point of view. The former has a tendency to focus on deterrence and prevention, while the latter emphasizes on investigation and attribution. This point is well identified in Maurer (2011)'s work. Maurer distinguished two streams of discourse in the United Nations on cyber security issues: the 7 19 Ibid., p. 13. politico-military stream, which mainly has to do with cyber arms race; and the economic stream focusing on the criminal use of information technologies 21 .
[Picture 1] Two Streams Model of Cyber Norm Emergence in the United Nations
While this Two Streams Model illustrates how international norms of cyber security is currently emerging in the United Nations and related organizations, it is nevertheless a result of close observation of the activities related to cyber norms emergence and thus has no normative implications for how the issue should be dealt with in reality. Just as cybercrime changed the landscape of criminal justice as mentioned above, the bigger picture of cyber attacks in general has also blurred the traditional boundaries that existed between crime and warfare.
Traditionally, regulation and deterrence of crime belongs to the purview of criminal justice and the perpetrator is punished by the law enforcement, which is mostly based on domestic law. On the other hand, warfare is conflict between states and follows the rules of international law. When physical attack was the only possible form of aggression, this dual approach and response was quite reasonable. But since stories of cyber attacks started to make the front page in all newspapers, it is becoming all the more difficult to conceptually distinguish between warfare and crime and decide how to resolve a certain case.
ii. The Problem of Demarcation and Attribution of Cyber Attacks
Nye (2010) has classified four major cyber threats to national security as economic espionage, crime, cyber war, and cyber terrorism 22 . These concepts are widely used, despite the fact that there is no universal definition for these concepts, making demarcation among them difficult. Nevertheless, basically all four concepts have one thing in common: they are all subject to the regulation of law. Cyber war should be ruled by international law, while cyber terrorism, cybercrime and economic espionage can be categorized as crime and is subject to criminal law. Since there is no fully developed international practice or norm regarding cyber war to date and both economic espionage and cyber terrorism can be classified as a type of cybercrime, there is no point in distinguishing between the type of legislation applied to each of the four attacks. Rather, demarcation has a bigger meaning in practical terms such as deciding the division of labor among relevant organizations and agencies in response to such incidents. Yet, even if one day we reach a point where the demarcation problem of cyber attacks based on standard definitions is resolved, due to the nature of the cyberspace it is difficult to attribute a certain attack to one of the four types of cyber attack. Technically this is because it is difficult to trace the attacker, and easier for the attacker to disguise or detour, Other than technical reasons there are legal problems in tracing information located overseas and difficulties in acquiring voluntary cooperation from foreign counterparts. Since a precise method for attribution has yet to be developed, the attribution process should be based upon several elements, such as the type of attack, subject, period of time, the size and impact of the attack, target of attack, and motive, put together. However, it is very difficult to collect all these information perfectly due to the distributed nature of cyber attacks and the lack of partnership among relevant organizations at the current stage.
Regarding criminal investigation, the discussion on the role in attribution is especially important. This It is a natural corollary for the law enforcement to play the central role in attribution since legal authority prescribed by the criminal justice procedure is necessary in identifying the origin and thus attributing a cyber attack case to a certain type of attack, and because it is generally allowed to take a criminal justice approach regardless of the type of attack. Under normal situations, a case should be first attributed to a certain type through investigation led by law enforcement agencies in order to decide how to respond to it depending on its type of attack.
However, the overall structure of cyber attacks response differs from one state to another, and some countries have cyber crisis management systems that put defense and damage restoration above cyber attack attribution. By doing so, it becomes extremely difficult not only in the attribution of a certain cyber attack, but also in generating information about the "changing nature of threats, the characteristics and methodologies of threats, and emerging threat idiosyncrasies for the purpose of developing response strategies and reallocating resources, as necessary, to accomplish effective prevention 24 ," which is critical for both the academic circle of criminology and decision-makers who establish national strategies for the cyberspace. A good example is the case of South Korea.
ii. Problems of the Current Structure (i) National Cybersecurity Regulation (NCR)
Among these three frameworks, the NCR represents the overwhelming control of the National Intelligence Service over the governmental information system.
[Picture 2] National Cybersecurity Regulation
Normally governmental CERTs are in charge of the monitoring, and relevant information is transferred to the NIS through networks. When an incident is detected, it is required to report to the NIS. The inspections are carried out by governmental agencies if it seems to be a 'trivial' case, but by the NIS if is a 'serious' one.
When national security is concerned, it is mandatory for law enforcement agencies to inform the NIS of the criminal case, whereas it is optional for the NIS to notify law enforcement agencies of the case if there is any criminal suspicion since. As most cyber incidents are crimes under the existing law, this optional clause could be in violation of the Criminal Procedure Act, which states that "when a public official in the course of his/her duty believes that an offense has been committed, he shall lodge an accusation" (Art. 234 (2)).
Moreover, this regulation also seriously undermines the basis for cybercrime measurement. Since 2009, the NIS stopped announcing the statistics of incidents against governmental information systems. As most cases handled by the NIS does not undergo police investigation, the nondisclosure of statistics severely flaws the current cybercrime statistics announced by the police.
In addition, recently the government has announced the National Cyber Security Master Plan in August 2011, which designated the Director of the NIS to oversee and coordinate national cybersecurity-related policy and management. This can be very dangerous, since national intelligence services act relatively free from legal restrictions due to the nature of its mission. When NIS operations are confined to providing national security intelligence to "support decision" making, the low legal threshold applied to the NIS usually does not matter. However, giving the NIS the authority to "coordinate" policy without any legal restrictions threatens the balance of power, which is one of the principles of democracy.
(ii) Security Incident Response in Private Sectors
The framework for Security Incident Response in Private Sectors also shows a simliar problem of overcentralization and lack of harmonization among relevant organizations. Article 48-3 of The Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, on which this framework is based, stipulates obligation to immediately report incidents against 1) a provider of information Both frameworks have little in mind of the nature of cyber attacks, i.e., the fact that most types of cyber attacks can and should be dealt according to the criminal law, and lacks an overall view of the problem, thereby granting excessive authority to either the intelligence service or the security community while failing to recognize the need to work with the law enforcement. This is a stark contrast compared to the incident response system of the United States, which is frequently referred to as a model cyber security framework. Many organizations prefer to appoint one incident response team member as the primary POC with law enforcement. This person should be familiar with the reporting procedures for all relevant law enforcement agencies and well prepared to recommend which agency, if any, should be contacted 25 ."
Not to mention that this failure to recognize the importance of law enforcement in incident management, it also seriously undermines the grounds for reliable measurement of cybercrime, either by giving the intelligence excessive authority in handling relevant information while paying insufficient attention to the role law enforcement plays in attribution, or by restricting the use of information of private sector security incidents to the analysis of causes of the intrusion and preparation of countermeasures, thereby blocking the information flow to law enforcement agencies for criminal investigation.
iv. Need for Harmonization among Organizations
Taking a look at the big picture of national security, the problems mentioned above seem to originate from the lack of consistency in the national cyber security strategy and organizational structures. As mentioned earlier, the current national cyber security structure was subject to changes every time a major security incident occurred. The words of Schnier (2000) case, the security policy needs to outline "why" and not "how" 26 ."
But the lack of consistency is not the root of the problem. Why new agencies were established every time an incident occurred is because South Korea does not have an overall national strategy based on inadequate threat analysis. This is why the current national cyber security structure of South Korea only explains "how" to deal with cyber incidents and which agency carries out what responsibilities, but does not tell "why" it has granted the NIS de facto control over incidents of governmental information networks, or "why" the information of private sector security incidents should be immediately destroyed after the analysis of cause is completed. Although the issue of cyber incident response may appear to be a complex issue, if anyone paid sufficient attention to the nature of cyber attacks and recognized the difficulty of attribution and measurement, law enforcement may have been playing an important role in detecting, attributing, and identifying the perpetrator. 13 
